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BUNGLING BUNDLING: THE HONEST LEADERSHIP AND OPEN GOVERNMENT 
ACT IS TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK FOR BUNDLING REFORM 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"Money, like water, will always find an outlet."1  Such is the cyclical nature of 
campaign finance law – when public outrage leads to laws that restrict one fundraising 
outlet, political professionals adapt to find another outlet.2  When the Watergate scandal 
spurred comprehensive campaign finance restrictions, politicians turned to “soft 
money.”3  When the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”) banned “soft-
money” and increased individual contribution limits,4 individual fundraisers became a 
                                                
1  McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003) (the Supreme Court 
held that fundraising restrictions imposed by BCRA were constitutional, but noted that 
the restrictions on soft money would not solve all problems associated with “the ill 
affects of aggregated wealth on our political system”). 
2 Michael J. Malbin & Thomas L. Gais, The Day After Reform: Sobering Campaign 
Finance Lessons from the American States 5 (1998); Anthony Corrado, Party 
Finance in the Wake of BCRA in The Election After Reform: Money, Politics, and the 
Bipartisan Reform Act 24-29 (Michael J. Malbin, ed. 2006).  
3 John Curtis Samples, The Fallacy of Campaign Finance Reform 211-20 (2006). 
4 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(f), 441(i) (2002). 
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popular outlet for campaign money.5  Meanwhile, the role of money in campaigns has 
steadily increased.6  
Today, “bundlers” (fundraisers who solicit checks from individual donors for a 
particular candidate)7 play a major role in the campaign finance system and often gain 
prominence and influence through their fundraising efforts.8  Though not a new practice, 
bundling experienced resurgence after Bush proved its powerful potential in the 2000 
Presidential election.9  Meanwhile, public discomfort with the practice has grown, 
spurred by a series of high-profile scandals involving bundlers.  Because bundlers 
                                                
5 Corrado, Party Finance in the Wake of BCRA, supra note 2 at 24-29; John 
Wildermuth, Campaign Finance Schemes Brought Too Much Light on Norman Hsu, 
San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 10, 2007, at A1. 
6 David B. Magelby, Change and Continuity in the Financing of Federal Elections in 
Financing the 2004 Election 10-11 (David B. Magelby et al. eds., 2006).  
7 Trevor Potter, Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, in The New Campaign Finance 
Sourcebook 130 (The Brookings Institution 2005) (citing 11 C.F.R. 110.6). 
8 Id. at 159, n. 170. 
9 The Election After Reform: Money, Politics, and the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act, 23 (Michael J. Malbin, ed. 2006) (noting that national parties modified 
existing fundraising networks to accommodate BCRA’s ban on soft money by 
converting existing fundraisers into bundlers; see also id. at 135 (“. . . the limit on 
contributions to the parties and the increase in individual hard money contribution limits 
have helped bundling organizations”). 
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deliver other people’s money rather than their own, however, their campaign finance 
activities often go totally undisclosed.10   
Norman Hsu was once a poster boy for would-be bundlers.  An entrepreneurial 
immigrant to the United States, Hsu became an elite democratic fundraiser by bundling 
millions of dollars for democratic candidates, including $850,000 for Hillary Clinton,11 
who even made a live appearance at his birthday party via closed-circuit television.12  
After federal officials discovered he was reimbursing contributors and fraudulently 
obtaining money from investors, however, he quickly became the poster boy for 
bundling abuse.13 
Such scandals highlight problems associated with bundling.  For example, 
bundlers can circumvent existing contribution limits by reimbursing those from whom 
they bundle checks.14  Fundraising scandals also raise concerns about corruption 
                                                
10 Trevor Potter, Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws supra note 6. 
11 Mike McIntire & Leslie Wayne, Democrats Turn from Big Donor Who’s Fugitive, N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 31, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/31/us/politics/31hsu.html. 
12 Ianthe Jeanne Dugan et al., The Bundler: How a Business Flop Became Political 
Force, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 12, 2007, at A1. 
13 Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Hsu Is Accused of Ponzi Scheme, Wall Street Journal, Sept. 
12, 2007, at A4 
14 See e.g. id. 
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because large bundlers enjoy access to politicians through bundling.15  Finally, bundling 
often has an appearance of corruption, which can undermine public confidence in the 
democratic process, even if actual corruption does not exist.16 
Until recently, most bundling was not a matter of public record.17  However, the 
newly enacted Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (“HLOGA” or “the 
Act”) requires congressional candidates to disclose lobbyist bundling.  HLOGA’s 
bundling provision (“the Provision”) is a positive first step towards tackling the problems 
associated with bundling.18  While the Supreme Court has held that some disclosure 
requirements run afoul of the First Amendment, HLOGA’s bundling measure is likely 
constitutional because it is justified by the government’s interests of preventing 
corruption and the appearance of corruption, providing valuable information to voters 
and assisting in the enforcement of other campaign finance laws.19  HLOGA’s bundling 
provision, however, does not go far enough.  The law should be drafted to require 
                                                
15 Brody Mullins, Donor Bundling Emerges As Major Ill in ’08 Race, Wall Street 
Journal, Oct. 17, 2007, at A1 (“Campaigns encourage ambitious bundling by rewarding 
top fund-raisers with perks, including access to candidates”). 
16 Editorial, Lax Lobbying Laws, L.A. Times, May 21, 2007, at NC, available at 
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-ed-
disclosure21may21,0,1866270.story?coll=la-opinion-leftrail. 
17 Trevor Potter, Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws supra note 6. 
18 Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, §204, 
121 Stat. 735, 2 USCS § 1601 (2007). 
19 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976). 
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disclosure of all federal bundling activity by applying to all bundlers (whether lobbyist or 
otherwise) and all campaigns (whether congressional or presidential).   
Part II for this note details the rise of bundling in campaigns, illuminating its 
associated problems.  Part III examines HLOGA’s bundling disclosure provision, 
discusses its shortcomings, and concludes that it fails to remedy several serious 
problems associated with bundling.  Part IV asserts that HLOGA does not violate the 
First Amendment and represents a constructive step towards much-needed bundling 
reform.  Part V proposes that effective bundling law must go beyond HLOGA to include 
all federal bundling activity, discussing policy and constitutional justifications. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF BUNDLING 
A. Pioneers of the Wild West – The Rise of Big Bundling 
The 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”) prohibited “soft money”20 
contributions to national political parties.21  BCRA’s drafters probably “did not anticipate 
that the ban would simply divert the flow of big contributions into other channels.”22  Or 
                                                
20 The FEC defines soft money as “funds raised and/or spent outside the limitations and 
prohibitions of the FECA . . . Soft money often includes corporate and/or labor treasury 
funds, and individual contributions in excess of the federal limit, which cannot legally be 
used in connection with federal elections, but can be used for other purposes.”  Fed. 
Election Comm’n, Twenty Year Report, ch. 3, available at http://www.fec.gov/pages/ 
20year.htm (1995). 




perhaps BCRA was intended as a sort of “legislative triage,”23 that focused on “solving 
the most dangerous campaign finance problems facing America” at the time.24  In any 
case, as soft money evaporated and candidates abandoned underfunded public 
financing (and its associated spending limits), candidates embracing the practice of 
bundling “hard money”.25   
                                                
23 Mark E. Schlegel, ‘More Loophole than Law’: A Case for the Repeal of I.R.C. §527, 
455 Berkeley Electronic Press 23 (2005), available at http://law.bepress.com/ 
expresso/eps/455. 
24 Fred Wertheimer, Taking Exception to a David Broder Column, Democracy 21, May 
27, 2004, available at http://www.democracy21.org/index.asp?Type=B_PR&SEC= 
{A8B4DE06-6CC2-419D-8A26-B5870F580B57}&DE={8861EA25-F9C2-4CF5-B584-
EAE212277EFF}; see also Anthony Corrado & Thomas E. Mann, Flap Over 527s Aside, 
McCain-Feingold is Working as Planned, The Brookings Institution, May 20, 2004, 
available at http://www.brookings.org/views/op-ed/mann/20040520corradomann. htm. 
(arguing that BCRA did not address all problems associated with problematic 
contribution channels because its principal goal was to prohibit elected officials and 
party leaders from extracting unregulated donations from corporations, unions and 
individual donors “in exchange for access to and influence with policymakers.”) 
25 Bradley A. Smith, Bundling Ban Would Unravel Free Speech, Politico, Oct. 20, 2007, 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories /1007/6596.html (“So it is true that bundling existed 
long before [BCRA], but it is also true that the 2002 law — and before that, the Federal 
Election Campaign Act — made bundling ever more important to campaigns.”); but see 
David G. Vance, Bundling No Byproduct of McCain-Feingold, Politico, Oct. 20, 2007, 
 
 7 
One commentary characterizes the current fundraising frenzy as a new “Wild 
West era.”26  Though bundling had been around for some time, President George W. 
Bush proved a pioneer of the “Wild West era,” when he revolutionized the practice of 
bundling during his 2000 presidential bid.  A few years earlier, four of Bush’s longtime 
supporters developed a name and structure for an elite group of contributors, whose 
goal was to escape the restraints of a public financing system enacted to reduce the 
influence of money in elections.27  Their means to achieve this goal was to create a 
network of people who could find at least 100 family members, friends, associates 
and/or employees willing to contribute the maximum individual donation allowed by law 
to a presidential candidate: $1,000, at the time.28  Aptly named “Pioneers,” Bush’s cadre 
“evolved from an initial group of family, friends and associates willing to bet on putting 
another Bush in the White House into an extraordinarily organized and disciplined 
machine.”29   
                                                                                                                                                       
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1007/6437.html (arguing that BCRA did not cause 
the bundling problem). 
26 Id. 
27  Thomas B. Edsall, Sarah Cohen & James V. Grimaldi, Pioneers Fill War Chest, Then 
Capitalize, Washington Post, May 16, 2004, at A01; see generally Financing the 2004 
Election  (David B. Magelby et al. eds., 2006) 




By 2004, Bush’s fundraising machine included corporate CEOs, Wall Street 
financial leaders, Washington lobbyists and Republican officials.30  That campaign 
raised more than $76 million, or 29% of Bush’s primary budget, from bundling 
“Pioneers” – who raised at least $100,000 – and “Rangers” – who raised at least 
$200,000.31  John Kerry followed suit, accumulating almost $42 million, or around 17% 
of his primary campaign budget, from 298 “Co-Chairs” who raised at least $50,000 and 
226 “Vice Chairs” who raised at least $100,000.32  In the end, the amount of money 
raised in the 2004 election broke nearly every campaign fundraising record.33  Despite 
the record-breaking funds raised, both candidates voluntarily disclosed extensive 
information about their bundlers.34     
                                                
30 Id. 
31 Public Citizen, The Importance of Bundlers to the Bush & Kerry Campaigns: 
Post-Election Summary of Findings 2 (Washington, D.C. 2004); Institute for 
Politics, Democracy and the Internet, Small Donors and Online Giving 5, 
http://www.ipdi.org/UploadedFiles/ Small%20Donors%20Report.pdf (hereafter “Small 
Donors”; Commentary, Candidates Bungle with Bundlers, The Christian Science 
Monitor, Oct. 2, 2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/ 2007/1002/p08s01-comv.html. 
32 Public Citizen, The Importance of Bundlers to the Bush & Kerry Campaigns, 
supra note 29. 
33 Small Donors, supra note 29. 
34 Public Citizen, The Importance of Bundlers to the Bush & Kerry Campaigns, 
supra note 29. 
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Because fundraising prowess is increasingly viewed as a mark of candidate 
viability, the 2008 presidential race appears destined to raise more bundled money than 
ever before.35  With more than a quarter of a billion dollars raised as of September 
2007, the 2008 race was already the most costly in U.S. history.36  To prepare for the 
election and display their fundraising aptitude, all major presidential hopefuls tapped 
their bundling networks.  Hillary Clinton depended on an army of “HillRaisers”.37  Rudy 
Giuliani employed a roster of “Pitchers,” “Sluggers,” “Captains,” and "All-American Team 
Captains," the latter pledging to collect $1 million in bundled contributions.38  Notably, 
although Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama have voluntarily agreed to disclose some of 
                                                
35 Small Donors supra note 29; see also Mullins, Donor Bundling Emerges As Major Ill, 
supra note 14 (estimating that bundled money represents 28.3% of all donations raised 
in the 2008 presidential election race and forecasting total fundraising to exceed $1 
billion).  
36 John Solomon & Matthew Mosk, Past Clouds Candidates’ Donor Lists, Washington 
Post, Sept. 20, 2007, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/ article/2007/09/19/AR2007091902508.html. 
37 Candidates Bungle with Bundlers, supra note 29. 
38 Id.; Wildermuth, Campaign Finance Schemes Brought Too Much Light on Norman 
Hsu supra note 29. 
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their bundlers, none of the 2008 candidates has met the same voluntary disclosure 
standards of Bush and Kerry in 2004.39   
B. “Bundled Bundling” – When Bundling Goes Bad 
“A gift that does nothing to enhance solidarity is a contradiction.”40 
While there is nothing inherently wrong with vigorous fundraising, a major 
concern is that bundling creates a climate ripe for corruption and influence buying, or at 
the very least, can carry an appearance of impropriety.41  News stories exposing high-
profile bundlers involved in illegal activities (both inside fundraising and outside of 
fundraising) has legitimized that concern.42   
Though the media have reported many cases of “bungled bundling,”43 perhaps 
the most egregious is that of Norman Hsu, a leading Democratic fundraiser, who raised 
                                                
39 Press Release, FEC Should Develop Full Disclosure System for Campaign Bundling 
Activity, Public Citizen, Nov. 30, 2007 at http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm? 
ID=2557.  
40 Mary Douglas, Foreword in Marcel Mauss, The Gift: Form and Reason for 
Exchange in Archaic Societies X (2002). 
41 Candidates Bungle with Bundlers, supra note 29; see also Mullins, Donor Bundling 
Emerges As Major Ill, supra note 14 (“Campaigns encourage ambitious bundling by 
rewarding top fund-raisers with perks, including access to candidates”). 
42 See Candidates Bungle with Bundlers, supra note 29; Wildermuth, Campaign Finance 
Schemes Brought Too Much Light on Norman Hsu supra note 29. 




more than $800,000 for Hillary Clinton and contributed more than $600,000 to other 
federal, state and municipal candidates from 2004-07.44  In all, Mr. Hsu collected well 
over $1 million in small checks for candidates, making him one of the biggest 
fundraisers in the nation.45  Hsu turned out to also be a fugitive, after fleeing from a 15-
year old conviction of felony grand theft for his role in a scheme to grand theft for his 
role in a scheme to defraud investors.46  Before his fugitive status came to light, Hsu 
                                                
44 Mike McIntire & Leslie Wayne, Democrats Turn from Big Donor Who’s Fugitive, N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 31, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/31/us/politics/31hsu.html; 
Ianthe Jeane Dugan & Brody Mullins, Leading Clinton Donor Stays Below the Radar, 
Wall Street Journal, Aug. 29, 2007, at A6.  Other candidates have run into problematic 
bundlers.  The Obama campaign gave $40,000 to charity that it collected from a 
fundraiser who was later indicted on corruption charges; the Edwards campaign 
returned the personal portion of $80,000 that a fundraiser collected from family and law-
firm partners; one of Mitt Romney’s bundlers was indicted with multiple fraud and other 
charges.  Likewise, George Bush’s “pioneers” included Enron CEO Kenneth Lay, who 
was convicted of fraud and conspiracy (vacated after his death), and lobbyist Jack 
Abramoff, who was sentenced to prison for fraud, tax evasion and bribery.  See 
Candidates Bungle with Bundlers, supra note 29; Wildermuth, Campaign Finance 
Schemes Brought Too Much Light on Norman Hsu supra note 29.    
45 Ianthe Jeanne Dugan et al., The Bundler: How a Business Flop Became Political 
Force, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 12, 2007, at A1. 
46 Mike McIntire & Leslie Wayne, Clinton Donor Under a Cloud in Fraud Case, N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 30, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/08/30/us/politics/30bundler.html?hp. 
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was considered one of an elite group of investors capable of raising $1 million.47  This 
enabled him special perks, such as repeated access to candidates.48   
After the Wall Street Journal broke a story about Hsu, he was arrested and 
charged Hsu with additional fraud and election-law violations.  Federal prosecutors 
believe that Hsu ran a massive “Ponzi scheme”49 that cost investors more than $60 
million.50  Further, Hsu used his status as a top political fundraiser to gain investors’ 
                                                
47 Ianthe Jeane Dugan & Brody Mullins, Leading Clinton Donor Stays Below the Radar, 
Wall Street Journal, Aug. 29, 2007, at A6. 
48 Mullins, Donor Bundling Emerges As Major Ill, supra note 14. 
49 A “Ponzi scheme” is a fraudulent investment operation that involves paying 
abnormally high returns to investors from money paid into the scheme by subsequent 
investors, rather than from net revenues generated by real business.  U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm (last visited Nov. 
14, 2007). 
50 Ianthe Jeanne Dugan et al, The Bundler: How a Business Flop Became Political 
Force, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 12, 2007, at A1; Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Hsu Is 
Accused of Ponzi Scheme, Wall Street Journal, Sept. 12, 2007, at A4 (“Federal 
prosecutors said in a criminal complaint that Democratic fund-raiser Norman Hsu 
pressured investors to make campaign contributions through him in order to raise his 




trust in his phony investments.51  One investor said, “I figured if Hillary trusted him, I 
could trust him."52  Hsu also used his status as a high-yield investor to coerce business 
contacts into making donations to his candidates of choice.53  One Hsu donor who 
contributed to Hillary Clinton noted that he was a lifelong Republican who contributed 
because he feared being cut out of Hsu’s next lucrative deal; another angry investor 
demanded that the Clinton campaign to return his check saying, “I was a donor who had 
my arm twisted to make a contribution to Hillary Clinton's campaign on behalf of 
Norman Hsu."54   
In addition to fraud charges, the federal complaint filed against Hsu alleged that 
Hsu donated money to politicians under other people’s names and reimbursed donors 
for checks he solicited.55  In August 2007, the Wall Street Journal reported that one of 
                                                
51 Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, et al., The Bundler: How a Business Flop Became Political 
Force, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 12, 2007 at A1. 
52 Id. 
53 Id.   
54 Id. 
55 See Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Hsu Is Accused of Ponzi Scheme, Wall Street Journal, 
Sept. 12, 2007, at A4; Mullins, Donor Bundling Emerges As Major Ill, supra note 14.  
This article also discusses other bundlers who were caught reimbursing contributors 
from whom they collected checks.  A Wisconsin developer, for example, pled guilty to 
repaying others for their donations; likewise, the former chairman of a Miami-based 
engineering firm pled guilty to crimes related to funneling $200,000 to $400,000 in illegal 
donations to congressional candidates from Florida to Alaska.  Id. 
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Clinton’s biggest sources of campaign donations was a tiny 1,280-square-foot green 
house in a working-class neighborhood near San Francisco International Airport.56  The 
owners of the home, the Paw family, were long-time Hsu associates who lived off a 
meager income from a gift shop and mail carrier salary.57  In addition to once listing the 
Paw home as his address58, Hsu’s donations mirrored the Paw family’s donations in 
terms of timing, amounts and donees.59  Though the Paws deny that Hsu reimbursed 
them, federal prosecutors believe Hsu reimbursed the family for their donations.60      
Hsu’s story illustrates several problems associated with bundling, specifically, 
circumvention of existing campaign finance law and the appearance of corruption.  
While it is legal for individuals to ask friends, colleagues and family members to make 
donations to political candidates, it is illegal to coerce them into giving or to reimburse 
them.61  Reimbursing donors for contributions effectively circumvents existing 
contribution limits because it allows an individual to contribute more than the legal limit.  
Further, when bundlers are involved in illegal activities outside of fundraising, it raises 
                                                
56 Brody Mullins, Big Source of Clinton’s Cash is an Unlikely Address, Wall Street 





61 See supra Leading Clinton Donor note 29. 
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serious suspicions that their bundled contributions may come from illegal sources such 
as foreign, hidden, coerced or reimbursed sources.62   
C.  Profile of a Bundler:  Who They Are and Why They Matter 
 
While some bundlers are lobbyists, most are not.63  A joint Campaign Finance 
Institute-Public Citizen study of over 2,000 individuals reported to be raising 
contributions for the 2008 presidential candidates found that 56 percent of the 
fundraisers came from three industries:  lawyers and law firms, three finance industries, 
and real estate.64  Notably, lobbyists were only the sixth most common industry, 
representing just 61 (around 3%) of the 2017 reported fundraisers.65  
                                                
62 Bill Getz, Chinese Donor Sounds Like ’96, Washington Times, Sept. 4, 2007, at 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070904/NATION/ 
109040060/1001. 
63 Mullins, Donor Bundling Emerges As Major Ill, supra note 14 (estimating that only 3% 
of bundlers for the 2008 presidential campaign are bundlers); see also Thomas B. 
Edsall, Pioneers Fill War Chest, Then Capitalize, supra note 26 (noting that about one-
fifth of Bush’s 2000 Pioneers were professional lobbyists). 
64 Campaign Finance Institute & Public Citizen, Majority of Presidential Bundlers 





Thus, law firms and businesses, whose profitably is directly affected by 
government regulatory and tax policies, make up a large.66  Others are individuals who 
are motivated by a broad range of interests such as political ideology, political 
aspirations or power.  However, their purpose could be “more nefarious, such as 
Norman Hsu’s alleged scheme to acquire credibility among investors, or, worse yet, it 
could be used to obtain government contracts, tax breaks, earmarks or public 
policies.”67     
If big bundling buys bundlers nothing else, it buys them access to candidates.68  
Such access raises corruption concerns, or at the very least, the appearance of 
corruption.  "The fact that we have great numbers of these individuals raising larger and 
larger sums means there are going to be more individuals, postcampaign, making 
                                                
66 Thomas B. Edsall, Pioneers Fill War Chest, Then Capitalize, supra note 26 (noting 
that half of Bush’s 2000 Pioneers were heads of companies whose profitably was 
affected by government regulatory and tax decisions).   
67 Press Release, FEC Should Develop Full Disclosure System for Campaign Bundling 
Activity, Public Citizen, Nov. 30, 2007 at http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm? 
ID=2557. 
68 Mullins, Donor Bundling Emerges As Major Ill, supra note 14 (“Campaigns encourage 




claims for policy preferences and ambassadorial posts."69  Candidates adamantly deny 
that they give special preference to campaign contributors when making policy or 
personnel decisions,70 but even if the candidates have good intentions, it is nearly 
impossible to separate the money and the relationships that come with the money.71  
Election law experts argue whether money can actually be traced to politicians’ 
                                                
69 Thomas B. Edsall, Pioneers Fill War Chest, Then Capitalize, supra note 26 (quoting 
Anthony Corrado, a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution and a political scientist at 
Colby College). 
70 Opinion, McCain Denies Impropriety, USA Today, Jan. 1, 2000, at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/e955.htm (Senator John McCain denied that his 
decision in favor of a major campaign benefactor by influenced by contributions); 
Roberto Suro & Juliet Eilperin, Loral Denies Benefits in Return for Donations, 
Washington Post, May 19, 1998, at A03 (President Clinton’s administration denied that 
the Chinese government sought to buy influence by coordinating a plan to illegally 
funnel as much as $2 million into U.S. political campaigns).  
71  Mullins, Donor Bundling Emerges As Major Ill, supra note 14. The article also 
provides an example of contributions and favors.  When Kenneth Lay, a 2000 Pioneer 
and then-chairman of Enron, was a member of the Energy Department transition team, 
he sent White House personnel director Clay Johnson III a list of eight persons he 
recommended for appointment to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Two 
were named to the five-member commission.  Id. 
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policies,72 but regardless of whether actual corruption takes place, the appearance of 
impropriety can undermine public confidence in the democratic process.  
Further, as the amount of money required for successful campaigns steadily 
increases, so does bundlers’ importance to candidates.  “The pressures of unlimited, 
arms-race spending has put the highest premium on presidential candidates finding 
bundlers who can raise huge amounts of money and the lowest premium on filtering out 
problematic bundlers.”73  Thus, it is unrealistic to expect campaigns to police 
themselves to identify problematic bundlers.   
Fixing all problems associated with bundling requires a multi-pronged 
approached invoking various campaign finance tools.  However, this article focuses on 
disclosure as a tool for reducing several serious problems associated with bundling.  To 
begin, we must first understand current election law related to disclosure generally and 
bundling specifically.  
 
 
                                                
72 See generally Rodney A. Smith, Money, Power, and Elections (2006) (arguing that 
there is no evidence that money actually influences political decisions on a large-scale); 
but see generally Stacy B. Gordon, Campaign Contributions and Legislative 
Voting: A New Approach (2005) (arguing that contributions have a real affect on 
congressional voting on issues that are most important to large contributors). 
73 Mullins, Donor Bundling Emerges As Major Ill, supra note 14 (interviewing Fred 
Wertheimer, the president of Democracy 21, a nonpartisan Washington-based group 
dedicated to reducing the influence of money in politics).   
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III. HONEST AND OPEN? BUNDLING LAW AND THE HONEST LEADERSHIP 
AND OPEN GOVERNMENT ACT 
 
A. Of Intermediaries and Conduits – A First Attempt at Bundling 
Legislation 
 
In Buckley, the Court anticipated the use of “intermediaries or conduits” to 
circumvent FECA’s contribution limits.  Federal regulations74 appeared impose some 
direct disclosure legislation on bundling – requiring reporting and record keeping for 
contributions received and forwarded by a “conduit or intermediary” to authorized 
committees of Federal candidates.75  Statute provides that 
all contributions made by a person, either directly or indirectly, on 
behalf of a particular candidate, including contributions which are 
in any way earmarked or otherwise directed through an 
intermediary or conduit to such candidate, shall be treated as 
contributions from such person to such candidate. The intermediary 
or conduit shall report the original source and the intended recipient 
of such contribution to the (Federal Election) Commission and to the 
intended recipient.76 
 
Under the statute, a “conduit or intermediary” must report to the FEC and the 
recipient candidate77 the name, mailing address, occupation, and employer of any 
individual who makes a contribution of more than $200.78  The recipient must then 
identify in its reports any conduit that provided one or more earmarked contributions 
above $200, the total amount of contributions made through that conduit, and 
                                                
74 2 U.S.C. 441(a)(8); 11 CFR 110.6. 
75 NPRM at 4. 
76 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(8)(2008). 
77 11 C.F.R. § 110.6(c)(1)(i). 
7811 C.F.R. § 110.6(c)(1)(iv)(A). 
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identifying information for individuals contributing more than $200.79  Thus, earmarked 
contribution disclosure is virtually identical to other contribution disclosure.80  The 
difference under 11 C.F.R. S 110.6 is that where a “conduit or intermediary” exercises 
“direction or control” over the choice of a recipient candidate, the “conduit or 
intermediary” must report this to the recipient candidate.81  The entire amount of the 
contribution is then credited to both the original contributor and the “conduit or 
intermediary.”82 
The description of contributions being directed through “conduits or 
intermediaries” appears to describe bundling – the “direction” being a bundlers 
solicitation of funds and the “conduit or intermediary” being the bundler.  However, 
these rules are widely misunderstood and largely dormant.83  When the FEC initially 
interpreted this law, it suggested that the law applied to some bundling activity.84  The 
                                                
79 11 C.F.R § 110.6(c)(2)(i)-(ii). 
80 Geoffrey M. Wardle, Political Contributions and Conduits After Charles Keating and 
Emily’s List: An Incremental Approach to Reforming Federal Campaign Finance, 46 Cal. 
W. L. Rev. 531 (1996). 
81 11 C.F.R S 110.6(d)(1). 
82 11 C.F.R S 110.6(d)(2). 
83 Bob Bauer, A Bundle of Issues:  The FEC’s Proposed Bundling Rules, Oct. 27, 2007, 
http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/ news.html?AID=1116 (noting these rules are 
poorly understood and largely dormant). 
84 See Internal Transfers of Funds by Candidates or Committees (AO 1975-10), 1 Fed. 
Election Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) ¶ 5116 (Aug. 21, 1975)(the FEC initially found “some 
 
 21 
FEC later liberalized its interpretation, however, concluding that a party’s 
recommendation to contribute to a specific candidate does not constitute “direction or 
control” if the contribution is initially sent to the soliciting conduit.85  In 1992, the FEC's 
inconsistent application of the “direction or control” clause rendered the law 
“meaningless”.86  The D.C. Court of Appeals declined to apply the “direction and control” 
disclosure requirements to a PAC that solicited contributions to be divided equally 
                                                                                                                                                       
control” existed when conduits requested that donors “earmark” previously made 
contributions); see also Employee Group as Political Committee (RE: AOR 1976-92), 2 
Fed. Election Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) ¶ 6951 (Nov. 10, 1976) (the FEC found control 
where a PAC recommended or solicited a contribution from a PAC participant’s private 
account).   
85 See Soliciting Contributions to Be Forwarded to Candidate (AO 1980-46), 1 Fed. 
Election Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) ¶ 5508 (June 25, 1980) (responding to the National 
Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC), the FEC concluded that 
contributions resulting from communications containing “a clear suggestion that the 
individual(s) receiving the communication(s) make a contribution to a specific candidate 
through NCPAC as an intermediary . . . would not be considered contributions by 
NCPAC. . . . Such contributions would only count against the contribution limitations of 
those persons making their contributions through NCPAC as an intermediary.”). 
86 Geoffrey M. Wardle, Political Contributions and Conduits After Charles Keating and 
Emily’s List: An Incremental Approach to Reforming Federal Campaign Finance, 46 Cal. 
W. L. Rev. 531 (1996). 
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among four unnamed candidates identified only by their state of residence.87  The court 
stated: “(t)o find direction or control on these facts would require a substantial shift in 
the Commission's construction of the language contained in § 110.6(d)”88  Thus, the 
“direction and control” clause has “virtually no effect” on bundling today.89 
B. Laws That Give Bundling Structure and Limits 
Several laws indirectly affect bundling by providing it with structure and limits.  
Contribution limits, for example, dictate the maximum amount bundlers can collect from 
each donor.  Likewise, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”) and 
Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) require a bundler who receives and forwards a 
contribution directly to a political committee to forward the contribution within 10 days 
and, if the contribution is more than $50, include the date of receipt and the name and 
address of the person making the contribution.90   
                                                
87 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm., 966 F.2d 1471, 1478 
(D.C. Cir. 1992). 
88 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm., 966 F.2d 1471, 1478 
(D.C. Cir. 1992). 
89 Geoffrey M. Wardle, Political Contributions and Conduits After Charles Keating and 
Emily’s List: An Incremental Approach to Reforming Federal Campaign Finance, 46 Cal. 
W. L. Rev. 531 (1996). 
90 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Reporting Contributions Bundled by 
Lobbyist/Registrants and Lobbyist/Registrant PACs, Federal Election Commission, 
Oct. 26, 2007, http://www.fec.gov/agenda/2007/mtgdoc07-71.pdf at 4 [hereafter 
“NPRM”].  2 U.S.C. 432 (b); 11 CFR 102.8. 
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C. HLOGA’s Bundling Provision: Lobbyist Disclosure in Congressional 
Campaigns 
 
Though they depend on bundling, some political leaders have echoed public 
discomfort with bundling.  2008 presidential candidate Senator Barack Obama, for 
example, pledged to reject contributions bundled by registered federal lobbyists and 
political action committees.  In an opinion piece endorsing bundling disclosure entitled 
“The Problem with Bundled Money,” Obama said:  
When it comes to reforming Washington and limiting the power of special 
interests, a man who died more than 60 years ago had exactly the right 
idea. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis said, ‘Sunlight is said to be 
the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.’ . . . 
Nearly a century later, we find Washington in need of a lot of sunlight and 
disinfectant.”91    
 
The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 200792 amends the 
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)93 to provide more vigorous 
                                                
91 Barack Obama, Op-Ed, The Problem with Bundling Money, Chicago Tribune, May 
21, 2007, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/chi-42f3tq7may21 
,1,1963769.story?ctrack=1&cset=true.  Still, Obama has enlisted 314 bundlers, several 
of whom work for law firms that also lobby, including Thomas Reed of Kirkpatrick & 
Lockhart Preston Gates Ellis LLP and Robert Litt of Arnold & Porter LLP.  Jonathan D. 
Salant, Watergate-Era Fundraising Returns with Clinton, Obama, Guliani, Bloomberg, 
Nov. 4, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601070&sid= 
aEey9CmFJ37Q&refer=home.  
92 Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, § 204, 
121 Stat. 735 (2007). 
93 2 U.S.C. 431 et seq. 
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requirements with respect to disclosure and enforcement of ethics and lobbying laws.94  
HLOGA’s stated purpose is “[t]o provide greater transparency in the legislative 
process.”95  Initial versions of the Act did not include bundling reform,96 but Senators 
Feingold and Obama introduced the bundling provision, which eventually became 
section 204 “Disclosure of Bundled Contributions.”97   
HLOGA’s bundling provision requires candidates’ political committees (i.e., 
candidate committees, political action committees) to file reports every six months with 
the Federal Election Commission.98  The reports must include the name, address, and 
                                                
94 Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, § 204, 
121 Stat. 735 (2007). 
95 Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, § 204, 
121 Stat. 735 (2007). 
96 See 2007 CONG US S. 1, 110th CONGRESS, 1st Session, S. 1, (August 02, 2007 
version) (containing § 204 bundling provision); but see 2007 CONG US S. 1, 110th 
CONGRESS, 1st Session, S. 1, (January 07, 2007 version) (did not contain §204 
bundling provision).  
97 Testimony of Sarah Dufendach, Mar. 1, 2007, House of Representatives, 110th 
Congress, 1st Session, S.1, 2007 WL 614902.  
98 2 U.S.C. 434(i); New Rules for Lobbyists and Lawmakers: The Bureau of 
National Affairs Guide to the New “Honest Leadership and Open Government 
Act” and Other Rules Changes by the 100th Congress (Steve France & Toby 
McIntosh, eds., Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 2007) (emphasis added) (hereafter 
“New Rules”.  
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employer of each person who is reasonably known to have forwarded, or who is 
credited with raising, two or more bundled contributions totaling more than $15,000.99  
The Act defines “person” as registered lobbyists100 or political action committees 
established or controlled by a lobbyist or lobbying organization.101  Accordingly, though 
the word “person” would appear to apply to all bundlers, the Act specifies that it only 
applies to lobbyist bundlers.  Thus, as noted in the previous section, a majority of 
bundling activity would continue to be undisclosed because the vast majority of 
bundlers, at least in Presidential campaigns, are not bundlers.102  The Act also only 
                                                
99 2 U.S.C. 434(i); New Rules, supra note 98. 
100 “Lobbyist/registrant” refers to registrants and lobbyists under the Lobbying 
Disclosure Act of 1995.  Such registrants are primarily organizations that employ one or 
more lobbyists.  Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Reporting Contributions 
Bundled by Lobbyist/Registrants and Lobbyist/Registrant PACs, Federal Election 
Commission, Oct. 26, 2007, http://www.fec.gov/agenda/2007/mtgdoc07-71.pdf at 13 
[hereafter “NPRM”].  
101 Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, 
§204(a)(i)(7), 121 Stat. 735 (2007). 
102 Campaign Finance Institute & Public Citizen, Majority of Presidential Bundlers 
and Other Fundraisers Hail from Only Five U.S. Industries, Dec. 20, 2007, available 




applies to congressional campaigns, leaving the more expensive and potentially more 
problematic presidential campaigns completely unchecked.103   
In October 2007, the FEC released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”) 
outlining several vague aspects of the Act.104  For example, the phrase “credited with 
raising” is problematic when multiple lobbyists are present at or co-host a single 
fundraiser.105  For example, it was unclear whether a lobbyist who co-hosts an event but 
plays no role in raising funds should be credited for funds raised.106  Similarly, should 
each co-host be credited with the full amount of the contributions raised at the event or 
should the total amount raised at the event be divided evenly among all co-hosts?  
These examples illustrate that under the law’s current language the total amount 
reported from such an event might be misleading or inaccurate.107   
Another problem is that the Act does not specify whether mandatory reporting 
extends to fundraising by persons who are not lobbyists but raise funds as employees 
or agents of a lobbyist or lobbying organizations.108  A section-by-section analysis of the 
Act, indicates that it only covers contributions credited to registered lobbyists 
                                                
103 Id.; NPRM at 1. 
104 NPRM at 4. 
105 Id. at 14-15; Bob Bauer, A Bundle of Issues:  The FEC’s Proposed Bundling Rules, 
Oct. 27, 2007, http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/news.html?AID=1116.  
106 Statement of Bradley A. Smith, House Judiciary Committee Testimony re: Lobbying 
Revision, Mar. 1, 2007, 2007 WL 614901.  
107 NPRM at 14-15. 
108 NPRM at 13; Bauer, Bundle of Issues, supra note 105. 
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themselves, and not to those collected by their employees or agents.109  During a 
discussion on the Senate floor, however, Senators Feingold and Obama indicated that a 
lobbyist’s employee who bundles a contribution would be subject to the disclosure 
requirements if the employee were acting as an agent of the lobbyist, even if the 
employee were not himself a registered lobbyist.110  Under this view, lobbyists would 
receive credit for funds collected by their employees or agents,111 which would prevent 
circumvention of HLOGA by closing a potential loophole by which lobbyists could avoid 
disclosure by using employees to bundle contributions.112  Because employees may act 
on behalf of lobbyists, their funds should be credited to their employer.113  This concept 
conforms with the application of other FECA requirements regarding agents, such as 
“soft money” fundraising restrictions, which apply to both federal candidates and their 
"agents.”114  Applying the “agent” concept to the HLOGA would take bundling rules in a 
similar direction by requiring lobbyists to disclose employee bundling activity.115    
The FEC’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking also illuminated HLOGA’s potential 
implications on contribution limits.  “Under current FEC regulations, a bundler may be 
                                                
109 NPRM at 14 (referencing 153 Cong. Rec. S10709 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2007)). 
110 NPRM at 13-14 (referencing 153 Cong. Rec. S10699 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2007) 
(statements of Sen. Feingold and Sen. Obama). 
111 Bauer, Bundle of Issues, supra note 105. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 2 U.S.C. § 441i (2002); Bauer, Bundle of Issues, supra note 105. 
115 NPRM at 13; Bauer, Bundle of Issues, supra note 105. 
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subjected to a charge against its contribution limit for the full amount raised and 
transmitted to a candidate.”116  This rule would resurrect the “conduit or intermediary” 
rules discussed in the previous section and would apply when a bundler exercises 
"direction or control" over the contribution.117  “Not much has happened under these 
rules for years:  [the rules] are largely dormant and certainly poorly understood.”  
However, as noted in the Notice for Proposed Rulemaking, the FEC is considering 
whether bundled contribution disclosures should "double count" by crediting such 
contributions to the original contributor as well as the bundler’s own limit.118  Such 
“double count” rules apply in other campaign finance law, such as when a PAC collects 
and forwards contributions to a candidate,119 where the amount collected counts 
towards the PAC’s limit as well as that of the original contributor.120  The “double count” 
interpretation would be a step toward “reinvigorating . . . limit-based bundling 
restrictions” from the “exercise and control” clause. 121  These potential bundling 
contribution limits arguably have a far greater effect on bundling than HLOGA’s 
disclosure requirements.122   
                                                
116 Bauer, Bundle of Issues, supra note 105. 
117 11 C.F.R. 110.6(d)(2).   
118 NPRM at 20-23; Bauer, Bundle of Issues, supra note 105. 
119 11 C.F.R. 114.2(f)(4).   
120 11 C.F.R. 114.2(f)(4).   
121 NPRM at 21. 
122 NPRM at 21. 
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IV. HLOGA’s BUNDLING PROVISION IS LIKELY CONSTITUTIONAL 
 
After interpreting what the Provision means, the next step is to analyze whether it 
is constitutional.  This is necessary because the Provision impacts the First Amendment 
rights of speech and association.  Part A discusses the constitutional framework for 
disclosure law and its historical context.  The framework provides a method for 
analyzing the Provision, while the historical framework traces the cyclical nature of 
campaign finance reform and adaptation by political professionals.  Part B analyzes the 
Provision under the constitutional framework, concluding that it is likely constitutional. 
 
A. Disclosure Law: Historical Context & Constitutional Framework 
 
More than 120 years ago in Ex parte Yarborough, the Supreme Court held that 
congressional power to regulate elections included the authority to protect elections 
against two great natural and historical enemies of all republics, “open violence and 
insidious corruption.”123  The Court described the source of corruption as the “free 
use of money in elections . . . .”124  Fifty years later, the Court endorsed disclosure a 
means of combating corruption in campaigns.125  In Burroughs v. United States,126 the 
Court deferred to the Congress’ conclusion that public disclosure of contributions would 
                                                
123 Id. (quoting Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 658 (1884) (emphasis added).   
124 Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 658. 
125 Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).   
126 See Araiza et al, Constitutional Law: Cases, History, and Dialogues 1310 (3d. 
ed. 2006) (quoting Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 546-48 (1934)).   
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discourage the corrupt influence of money in elections.127  The Court reasoned that 
Congress’s power to protect the election of the President and Vice President implicitly 
included discretion to select the means of achieving that end.128 
In 1974, “[u]pon signing the most systematic restrictions on campaign finance in 
American history, President Gerald Ford declared, ‘the times demand this 
legislation.’”129  The times he referred were the Watergate times and the systemic 
campaign finance restrictions were the 1974 amendments to the Federal Election 
Campaign Act (“FECA”).130    
The Watergate scandal enflamed public concerns about corruption in the 
government, illuminating the potential for corruption inherent in campaign financing.131  
While commonly associated with presidential abuse of power, Watergate also involved 
campaign finance abuse.132  For example, Nixon’s Committee for Reelection of the 
President used money derived from campaign contributions133 to hire burglars to break 
                                                
127 Burroughs 290 U.S. at 548. 
128 Id. at 547-48. 
129 John Curtis Samples, supra note 3 at 211 (2006). 
130 Id. at 211-212.   
131 Araiza, supra note 115, at 1310; Jason B. Frasco, Full Public Funding: An Effective 
and Legally Viable Model for Campaign Finance Reform in the States, 92 Cornell L. 
Rev. 733, 737 (2007).  
132 John Curtis Samples, supra note 3 at 212-215.  
133 Id.  
 
 31 
into the Democratic National Committee headquarters.134  Nixon’s campaign 
committees also violated an array of campaign finance laws, including raising more than 
$500,000 from illegal sources to finance “dirty tricks” against Nixon’s enemies and to 
cover-up the DNC burglary.135  Further, links between Nixon’s campaign contributions 
and his policy decisions and ambassador suggested impropriety.136  Finally, the 
Watergate crisis and Nixon’s subsequent resignation caused widespread public outcry 
and distrust of the government, creating “a political climate where congressional 
majorities could pass virtually any restrictions on campaign finance.”137    
Reacting to public concerns and disillusionment, Congress passed amendments 
to the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”).138  The amendments regulated several 
aspects of campaign finance including disclosure of donations, public funding for 
presidential campaigns, and creation of the Federal Election Commission.139  In the 
                                                
134 Michael J. Malbin, A Public Funding System in Jeopardy, in The Election After 
Reform: Money Politics, and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 220 (Michael J. 
Malbin, ed. 2006). 
135 Samples, The Fallacy of Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 127 at 212-216. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55; see also Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 
92-255, §§ 201(e)-(f), 305, 88 Stat, 11-12, 16 (1972). 
139 Erwin Chemerinsky, Preserving an Independent Judiciary: The Need for Contribution 
and Expenditure Limits in Judicial Elections, 74 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 133, 136 (1998); see 
also NC for second part. 
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lodestar campaign finance decision Buckley v. Valeo,140 the Supreme Court upheld a 
FECA disclosure provision that required individuals and groups who expressly 
advocated for or against a federal candidate to disclose their related contributions and 
expenditures.141  The Court applied “intermediate scrutiny,” stating that to be upheld, a 
disclosure provision must be justified by an important public interest and have a 
relevant correlation or substantial relation to the public interest being served.142  In 
rejecting a First Amendment challenge,143 the Court held that FECA’s disclosure 
requirements furthered three “sufficiently important” interests: (1) deterring actual and 
apparent corruption; (2) providing information to voters, and (3) aiding in the 
enforcement of other campaign finance law.144   
                                                
140 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Richard L. Hasen, Justice Souter: Campaign Finance Law’s 
Emerging Egalitarian, Preliminary Draft October 2007, 1 Albany Government Law 
Review (2008). – CHECK WITH HASEN On this ONE. 
141 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976).  For a discussion of disclosures law, see Richard L. Hasen, 
The Surprisingly Easy Case for Disclosure of Contributions and Expenditures Funding 
Sham Issue Advocacy, 3 Election L.J. 251 (2004). 
142 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976).   
143 Trevor Potter, Campaign Finance Disclosure Law in The New Campaign Finance 
Sourcebook 137 (2005). 
144 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-68; see also Hasen, supra note 131 at 251-52.   
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In the 1970’s and 1980’s, the Court “frequently upheld FECA’s disclosure 
framework.”145  In the 1990’s, however, the Court’s disclosure opinions became more 
unpredictable.146  Twenty years after Buckley in McIntyre v Ohio Elections 
Commission,147 the Supreme Court “seemed to draw back from [the] relatively relaxed 
standards applied to the review of mandated disclosures.”148  In McIntyre, the Court 
appeared to employ a strict scrutiny standard of review and conduct a searching 
overbreadth analysis, requiring narrow tailoring of a compelling government interest.149   
The law at issue required ballot initiatives materials to disclose on their face the 
name of the entity providing the literature.150  An elderly pamphleteer challenged a fine 
imposed on her for distributing anonymous leaflets opposing a proposed school tax 
                                                
145 Trevor Potter, Campaign Finance Disclosure Law in The New Campaign Finance 
Sourcebook 140-41 (2005). 
146 Trevor Potter, Campaign Finance Disclosure Law in The New Campaign Finance 
Sourcebook 140-42 (2005). 
147 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
148 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 334.  Robert F. Bauer, Not Just a Private Matter:  The 
Purposes of Disclosure in an Expanded Regulatory System, 6 Election L.J. 38, 41 
(2007). 
149 Trevor Potter, Campaign Finance Disclosure Law in The New Campaign Finance 
Sourcebook 141 (2005). 
150 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 334, 338, n.3 (providing the Ohio disclosure statute); Hasen, 
supra note 131 at 252. 
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levy.151  Citing historical protection of anonymous First Amendment rights, the Court 
struck down the Ohio statute.152  The Court noted that the First Amendment affords “the 
broadest protection” to core political expression, to ensure an unfettered exchange of 
ideas to bring “political and social changes desired by the people.”153  The Court 
concluded that ballot measures did not carry the threat of corruption and circumvention 
that would trigger Buckley’s three justifications.154  Scalia offered the lone dissent, 
nothing that the Court was ignoring its primary justification of informational interest in 
Buckley.155  
In Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation Inc. (“ACLF”), the Court 
again addressed disclosures related to “core political speech.”156  ACLF addressed two 
compelled disclosure requirements in the context of ballot initiative petitions.  The first 
required petition circulators to wear a name badge while soliciting initiative signatures; 
                                                
151 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 334.  CHECK THIS. 
152 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 346-47 (“[D]iscussion of public issues and debate on the 
qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government 
established by our Constitution”); id. at 342 (citing historically significant anonymous 
works such as the Federalist Papers).  
153 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 336 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 
(1957)(emphasis added)(internal quotations omitted). 
154 Id. at 348-49. – CHECK THIS CITE 
155 Bauer, supra note 32, at 42 (citing McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 384)(Scalia, J. dissenting)). 
156 Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 186-87 
(1999) [hereafter “ACLF”].  
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the other required disclosure of the names and addresses of all paid circulators.157  A 
unanimous Court struck down the name badge requirement, citing concerns that the 
requirement would chill speech and indicating that the provision lacked a sufficient state 
interest.158  A majority also struck down the circulator reporting provisions.159  The Court 
reasoned that ballot initiatives did not involve the risk of “quid pro quo corruption present 
when money is paid to, or for, candidates”160 and noted that the statute’s other 
disclosure provisions sufficiently promoted the state’s antifraud and informational 
interests.161      
The Court’s exacting scrutiny melted away in McConnell v. FEC,162 however, 
where the Court applied a more deferential standard to uphold key portions of BCRA, 
“the most important piece of federal campaign finance legislation in a generation,” 
against a facial constitutional challenge.163  Likely because McConnell invoked 
contribution disclosures instead of core political speech disclosures, the majority 
opinion paid little attention to the apparent tension created by McIntyre, relegating it to a 




160 Id.  (emphasis added). 
161 Id. 
162 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
163 Richard L. Hasen, Rethinking the Unconstitutionality of Contribution and Expenditure 
Limits in Ballot Measure Campaigns, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 885, 891 (2005). 
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mere footnote.164  The Court held that BCRA’s extension of contribution disclosure rules 
furthered the same three interests promulgated in Buckley: deterring corruption, 
providing information to voters, and aiding in the enforcement of other campaign finance 
law. 165  However, the Court largely ignored constitutional questions.166  Thus, the 
McConnell decision “overall displays unprecedented deference to congressional 
judgments and appears to apply only cursory attention to First Amendment interests 
that might be balanced in evaluating any campaign finance regime.”167  
 
B. Cloudy Transparency: HLOGA is Likely Constitutional But Could Be 
Better 
 
Many of the critiques discussed in section III(C) (“What HLOGA Does and Why It 
Falls Short”) are relevant to the inquiry of whether HLOGA is constitutional.  For 
example, the critique that HLOGA fails to apply to all bundlers is relevant in the 
constitutional analysis when balancing the government interests (i.e. deterring 
corruption) against the infringement on constitutional rights.  Thus, several of the 
critiques discussed above are applied here under a constitutional analysis.  
                                                
164 See Bauer, supra note 32, at 42 (referencing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 207, n. 88, 
McConnell’s lone reference to McIntyre ). 
165 McConnell, 540 U.S. at (Sc Ct. 690). NC.  
166 Hasen, supra note 29 at 252-56. 
167 Hasen, supra note 29 at 256 (emphasis added); see Richard L. Hasen, Buckley is 
Dead: Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. 
Federal Election Commission, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 31 (2004).  
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The Supreme Court cases discussed above provide a constitutional framework to 
evaluate HLOGA’s bundling disclosure provision.  The Court’s history regarding 
disclosures has been mixed, with the Court paying less deference to laws restricting 
core political speech and more deference to laws requiring contribution disclosures.  
The preliminary question, then, is whether HLOGA’s bundling provision involves core 
political speech, contribution disclosures or something in between.  After settling on the 
appropriate level of scrutiny, the next step is to identify the government’s interests and 
weigh them against any constitutional infringement.  In the past, the Court has 
continuously cited reducing corruption and the appearance of corruption as a 
compelling government interest that justifies disclosures.  Likewise, the Court has held 
that disclosures provide useful information to voters and assist in enforcement of other 
campaign finance law.    
  1. Level of Scrutiny  
The preliminary question is whether HLOGA’s bundling provision involves core 
political speech, contribution disclosures or something in between.  HLOGA’s bundling 
provision regulates activity of lobbyists who collect or solicit contributions from 
individuals.  This involves disclosure of contributions, but also invokes freedom of 
association because bundlers function by soliciting checks from others.  Accordingly, 
HLOGA’s bundling provision is not a straightforward Buckley contribution disclosure 
because it targets bundler’s solicitation or collection of others’ contributions rather 
than the contributions themselves.  The Provision is “contribution-like,” however, 
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because it involves individual contributions and can carry a quid pro quo potential 
similar to that of large contributions.168   
The Court should not classify the Provision as impacting core political speech like 
the anonymous leaflets from McIntyre or the ballot measure initiatives from ALCF.   
Though arguably bundling individuals, like the elderly woman distributing anonymous 
pamphlets in McIntyre, have a right to anonymous political speech169 and contribute to 
the marketplace of ideas by associating with like-minded political individuals when 
soliciting money for their preferred candidate, bundling falls short of core political 
speech.170  Bundling does not involve the “marketplace of ideas” for bringing about the 
political and social changes desired by the people, but rather, more closely mirrors the 
contribution and expenditure disclosures upheld in Buckley, which required individuals 
and groups advocating for the election or defeat of a candidate for federal office to file 
                                                
168 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27. 
169 Daniel Hays Lowenstein & Richard L Hasen, Election Law: Cases and Materials 
1016 (3d ed. 2004).  The secrecy of the voting booth has been associated with 
preventing corruption of voters; likewise, some argue that a secret “donation booth” 
could better prevent corruption of candidates and elected officials, without infringing on 
first amendment speech and association rights.  Going even further, some argue that 
donor anonymity should be mandatory.  See generally Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayers, 
Voting with Dollars: A New Paradigm for Campaign Finance (2002) (endorsing a 
combination of mandatory donation anonymity and campaign finance vouchers). 
170 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 336 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 
(1957)(internal quotations omitted). 
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reports.171  Similarly, full bundling disclosure requires campaigns to file reports detailing 
the name, mailing address, employer, occupation, amount of bundled money and other 
relevant information.  Thus, the Court should apply intermediate scrutiny, requiring 
HLOGA’s disclosure provision to be justified by an important public interest and have 
a relevant correlation or substantial relation to the public interest being served.172   
2. Deterring Corruption and the Appearance of Corruption 
 
After settling on the appropriate level of scrutiny, the next step is to identify the 
government’s interests and weigh them against any constitutional infringement.  In 
Buckley, the Supreme Court justified restrictions on campaign contributions as follows: 
“[T]he primary interest served by these limitations . . . is the prevention of corruption and 
the appearance of corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of 
large financial contributions on candidates’ positions and on their actions if elected to 
office.”173  While this language applies to contribution limits instead of disclosures, it 
articulates the Court’s reasoning regarding the appearance of corruption, suggesting 
that the Court considers the appearance of corruption to be a serious problem.  This 
simplifies the constitutional analysis by eliminating the inquiry of whether apparent 
corruption is real or imagined.174  
                                                
171 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74.   
172 Id. at 16. 
173 Id. at 25. 
174 See generally Rodney A. Smith, supra note 72 (arguing that evidence fails to 
establish a compelling connection between political decision-making and campaign 
contributions); but see Stacy B. Gordon, supra note 72 (demonstrating that campaign 
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HLOGA’s bundling provision serves the government’s interest of preventing 
corruption or the appearance of corruption because disclosures act as a check on 
lobbyists and the candidates receiving their money by exposing them to public scrutiny.  
Section II cites several examples of illegal fundraising through bundling and the 
appointment of bundlers in administrations.  These stories, at the very least, create an 
impression of impropriety.  The documentation of bundling problems and the Court’s 
longstanding approval the government’s anticorruption interest, suggests the Court 
should find that HLOGA is served by the important government interest of deterring 
corruption and the appearance of corruption.  
The next step under the constitutional analysis is to scrutinize the means-end 
relationship between the law and its asserted purposes.  The Court should apply an 
intermediate scrutiny, requiring that HLOGA have a relevant or substantial relation to 
the government’s interest of preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption.175  
The Provision applies only to lobbyist bundlers and may carry an unintended effect of 
actually strengthening bundling, which weakens the means-end relationship. 
As discussed extensively elsewhere, several studies estimate that only three 
percent of known bundlers in the 2008 presidential campaign are lobbyists.176  While 
this percentage reflects lobbyists in presidential campaigns as opposed to all bundlers, 
it powerfully illustrates that lobbyist bundlers do not dominate the world of big bundling.  
                                                                                                                                                       
contributions have a real affect on congressional voting for issues that are most 
important to large contributors). 
175 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64. 
176 Mullins, Donor Bundling Emerges As Major Ill, supra note 14. 
 
 41 
Because lobbyist bundlers represent a fraction of all bundlers, the Provision leaves a 
large majority of bundling activity completely undisclosed.  Further, the Provision applies 
only to congressional bundling, which leaves presidential bundling completely 
undisclosed.     
Further, the “light of publicity” might actually enable corruptive influences.177  
“This will be a boon for reporters in search of stories, but it won't diminish the power of 
Washington's top lobbyists. Such federal disclosure . . . provides ‘free advertising’ for 
[lobbyists] . . . to woo special interests craving influence and lawmakers in need of 
campaign cash.”178  One lobbyist noted that before the Act, lobbyist bundling was the 
stuff of tall tales spun with fellow lobbyists over drinks, debating who brought in the 
biggest bundle.179  After the Act, the lobbyist said he enjoys “full disclosure with a 
congressional blessing.”180  Some believe this “free advertising” might actually spur 
                                                
177 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 67, 96 (1975)(“Disclosure laws deter actual corruption 
and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and 
expenditures to the light of publicity.”).  







lobbyists to compete harder to raise money, which could undermine the Act’s 
effectiveness in curbing corruption and the appearance of corruption.181     
These problems weaken the means-end relationship between HLOGA’s purpose 
of preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption and what it actually achieves.  
However, while the Provision could carry the unintended negative consequence of 
providing increased credibility to bundlers with which they can seek greater influence, 
such publicity could also make politicians more careful when considering granting a 
favor or appointment.  Because the Court should employ intermediate scrutiny, the 
Court would only inquire whether the law had a relevant or substantial relation to the 
asserted government interest.182  Accordingly, the Court should find that requiring 
disclosure of lobbyist bundlers has a substantial relation to reducing corruption or the 
appearance of corruption by exposing lobbyist bundlers and the candidates who accept 
their money to “the light of publicity.”183 
 3. Providing Information to Voters 
Under Buckley’s second justification – providing information to voters – the 
Provision is likely justified.  The Court has repeatedly endorsed the informational 
interest of disclosures.  HLOGA’s information about lobbyist bundlers allows voters to 
make better-informed decisions by disclosing which lobbyists are bundling for 
congressional candidates.  The transparency associated with disclosure allows the 
                                                
181 Mostly Cosmetic, The Economist, Sept. 20, 2007, available at 
http://www.economist.com/world/na/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9833277. 
182 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64. 
183 Id. at 65. 
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public to track contribution trends and speak with their vote by punishing candidates 
who are corrupt or appear corrupt.  The improvement may be slight, however, given the 
number of bundlers who are not lobbyists, and HLOGA’s application only to 
congressional elections.  Further, as noted, the Provision currently suffers from vague 
language that could hamper meaningful reporting if interpreted unfavorably.   
While generally favoring disclosure as a means of providing information to voters, 
the McIntyre Court concluded that a voter’s informational interest of identifying a 
leaflet’s writer did not justify the disclosure requirements in the statute.184  Information 
provided by HLOGA’s bundling provision might not be overwhelming, given the limited 
information the Provision provides (especially when compared to what it could have 
provided).  However, under an intermediate scrutiny, HLOGA’s disclosure requirement 
has a substantial relation to increasing transparency and thereby providing information 
to voters.  By allowing the public and the media to access information about candidates 
and their bundlers, the public has the capacity to make better decisions about who they 
choose in an election.185  Thus, while the information provided by the Act is under-
                                                
184 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348-49; Hasen, supra  note 29 at 252.  
185 See, for example, non-governmental websites that track contributions to candidates 
by analyzing public documents, which are created from mandatory campaign finance 
reporting.  See generally http://www.whitehouseforsale.org and 
http://www.opensecrets.org.  Currently, non-governmental agencies and non-profits 
primarily track bundling via voluntary disclosures.  The Provision enables such websites 
to track and report lobbyist bundling activities using primary sources, namely FEC 
reports.  The FEC also recently released its own online campaign finance tracking tool 
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inclusive, it is nevertheless constitutionally justified because it provides useful 
information to the public.   
4. Aiding in the Enforcement of Other Campaign  
Finance Law  
 
HLOGA fulfills Buckley’s final justification – assisting in the enforcement of other 
campaign finance laws – in several ways.  A significant problem associated with 
bundling is that fundraisers can use it to circumvent campaign contribution limits.  
Related to this problem is that bundlers can coerce donors into contributing, which in 
addition to violating campaign finance law, also inhibits the contributors’ first 
amendment rights.186   
HLOGA’s main impact on the enforcement of existing campaign finance law is its 
transparency.  Because HLOGA requires disclosure of lobbyist bundlers, the FEC (or 
the “watchdog” media) can identify bundling that violates existing campaign finance 
laws.187  For example, the Wall Street Journal relied on publicly available FEC 
                                                                                                                                                       
called “Campaign Finance Maps” that allows the public to track Congressional and  
Presidential election contributions.  The Provision would supplement the information 
provided in this tool.  See Administering and Enforcing Federal Campaign Finance Law, 
Campaign Finance Maps, http://www.fec.gov. 
186 Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, et al, The Bundler: How a Business Flop Became Political 
Force, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 12, 2007 at A1 (reporting that some of the donors 
Norman Hsu recruited said they contributed because they felt pressured or coerced to 
do so).  
187 See note 185 for a discussion of how the public might access such information.  
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contribution reports to break the Hsu story by tracking Hsu’s contributions to the Paws, 
which eventually led to Hsu’s indictment for campaign finance violations.188  Disclosure 
of lobbyist bundlers would allow the public, the media and the FEC to review bundling 
disclosures for these “red flags” – potential circumvention of existing campaign laws – 
and take legal or political action.   
Under an intermediate scrutiny, the means-end relationship is likely sufficient.  
Arguably, lobbyists are more familiar with campaign finance laws (because bundling is 
part of their job) and are accordingly accustomed to following them.  Thus, exposing 
seasoned lobbyists to scrutiny but leaving the vast majority of bundlers in the shadows 
perhaps does little to aid in the enforcement of other campaign finance laws overall.  
After all, under the Provision, Hsu’s contributions but not bundling activities would have 
been a matter of public record because he was not a lobbyist.  However, even if this is 
true, lobbyist bundlers could conceivably violate existing campaign finance laws while 
bundling.  Thus, under the intermediate scrutiny standard HLOGA is substantially 
related to assisting in the enforcement of other campaign finance laws because it allows 
the public and government to review lobbyists bundling for campaign finance violations. 
V. IN THE INTEREST OF FULL DISCLOSURE: EFFECTIVE BUNDLING LAW 
MUST GO BEYOND HLOGA 
 
The modern debate over campaign finance laws is driven by two fundamentally 
different attitudes about the relationship between money and campaigns.189  One side 
                                                
188 Brody Mullins, Big Source of Clinton’s Cash is an Unlikely Address, Wall Street 
Journal, Aug. 28, 2007 at A3. 
189 Malbin, The Day After Reform, supra note 2 at 1.  
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rests upon the idea that human beings are not angels,190 so legislation is needed to 
prevent money from corrupting politicians and harming democracy by robbing voters of 
power.191  At the opposite end of the spectrum are those who view restrictions on 
political money as weakening democracy because they limit freedom of speech and 
naturally favor incumbents.192  Despite these seemingly polar opposite views, both 
philosophies favor disclosure.193  “Disclosure is the basic foundation on which all other 
[campaign finance] regulation must rest.”194  Thus, building an effective foundation for 
campaign finance reform is important.195  
                                                
190 The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison). 
191 Malbin, The Day After Reform, supra note 2 at 1. 
192 Malbin, The Day After Reform, supra note 2 at 2; see also Rodney A. Smith, 
supra note 71 at 61 (“placing arbitrary limits on the availability and flow of money in 
politics weakens rather than strengthens the democratic electoral process because it 
limits freedom of speech”). 
193 See Rodney A. Smith, supra note 72 at 95 (arguing that full, complete and timely 
financial disclosure alone is the constitutionally correct approach for dealing with “the 
vexing problem of the perception of money in politics.”); cf. Malbin, The Day After 
Reform, supra note 2 at 30 (advocating comprehensive campaign finance reforms but 
noting that disclosure must be the foundation of such reform). 
194 Malbin, The Day After Reform, supra note 2 at 1. 30 (1998). 
195 The importance of building a stable foundation on a house, for example, was 
recognized in ancient texts.  See Matthew 7:24-25 (King James) (“a wise man, which 
built his house on a rock.  And the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds 
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To approach effective bundling reform, all federal candidates must disclose all 
big bundlers (those raising more than $15,000 in a 6-month period).  The reason 
Congress chose to single out lobbyists is unclear, but it may be because the Act was 
regarded mainly as lobbyist and ethics legislation196 and because the provision was only 
added after the bill went to the Senate.197  During congressional testimony regarding the 
bundling provision, however, an election law expert testified:  
[M]uch of the money raised for federal campaigns (in particular, for 
presidential campaigns) is not raised by lobbyists but by friends of a 
candidate or by senior corporate executives who do not meet the definition 
of 'lobbyist.'  The bundling rules only apply to contributions collected or 
arranged by those defined as lobbyists.  If Congress is interested in a 
more complete disclosure provision, it would have to apply to all 
                                                                                                                                                       
blew, and beat upon that house; and it fell not: for it was founded upon a rock”); Luke 
6:48 (“a man . . .  who digged deep, and laid the foundation on a rock: and when the 
flood arose, the stream brake against that house, and could not shake it: because it was 
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196 Manu Raju, Ethics Bill is Bound for Whitehouse, The Hill, Aug. 3, 2007, at 
http://thehill.com/leading-the-news/ethics-bill-is-bound-for-white-house-2007-08-03.html 
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197 See 2007 Congress US S.1, 110th CONGRESS, 1st Session, S. 1, (Aug. 2, 2007 
version) (containing § 204 bundling provision); but see 2007 Congress US S.1, 110th 




individuals, not just lobbyists.  Consequently, the bundling provision as 
written . . . is vague and open to misapplication.198 
   
Arguably, laws targeting lobbyists affect those who are in the business of affecting 
legislation are more strongly justified under Buckley’s prong of preventing corruption 
and the appearance of corruption.  However, lawyers, business leaders and individuals 
may also seek to influence legislation, even if they are not directly paid to do so.  
Business leaders and lawyers also have a high stake in influencing legislation because 
their financial profitability is directly connected to the legislation.199  Individuals also 
might bundle in hopes of obtaining personal favors or appointments.200  Accordingly, 
                                                
198 Kenneth Gross, Lobbying Provision, Testimony on Mar. 1, 2007, Committee on 
House Judiciary, Subcommittee on Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, 2007 
WL 614899. 
199 In 2006-07, the average lobbyist made $92,827 per year 
(http://swz.salary.com/salarywizard), whereas the average CEO of a Standard & Poor’s 
500 company made $14.78 million in total compensation per year (2007 Executive Pay 
Watch, http://www.aflcio.org/corporatewatch/paywatch/).  Though lobbyists get paid to 
influence legislation, CEO’s have a huge stake in influencing legislation, both for their 
own bottom line and that of their companies.  
200 David Nitkin, Bundlers Raise Millions for Candidates, Baltimore Sun, Nov. 11, 2007, 
available at http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/ideas/bal-id.bundlers11nov11,0, 
1055813.story?page=1 (“Top government positions, invitations to state dinners and 
entree to the Oval Office are some of the perquisites that await many of the best-
connected bundlers - time-honored rewards if their candidate succeeds.”)   
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contributions from law firms, businesses and individuals also have a potential for 
corruption or for the appearance of corruption.  Thus, the distinction between lobbyists 
and other bundlers cannot be justified.  To single out lobbyists simply because their 
official “job” is to influence legislation, largely misses the point as well as an opportunity 
to enact effective bundling disclosure. 
Disclosures provide minimal infringement upon free speech, as compared with 
more stringent forms of bundling legislation, such as direct restrictions on bundling or a 
bundling ban.201  Accordingly, full bundling disclosure represents a relatively 
unrestrictive means of achieving the three important public interests from Buckley.  Full 
disclosure would more powerfully deter corruption and avoid the appearance of 
corruption by exposing all large bundlers to the “light of publicity.”202  Likewise, the 
informational benefit to voters would be greater than HLOGA’s current provision 
because the public would have a more complete understanding of where candidates 
                                                
201 Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance “Reform” Proposals: First Amendment Analysis, 
Cato Policy Analysis No. 282, Sept. 4, 1997, at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-
282.html (arguing that ban on bundling is a clumsy solution that raises a host of 
Constitutional issues and could be held to infringe on First Amendment rights because it 
directly burdens the association rights of individual contributors); Bradley A. Smith, 
Bundling Ban Would Unravel Free Speech, Politico, Oct. 29, 2007, 
http://www.politico.com/ news/stories/1007/6596 (Former FEC chairman arguing that a 
ban on bundling would kill would “kill some of our political speech rights and entrench 
incumbents.”)  
202 Id. at 202 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976)).  
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receive their money.  Finally, full bundling disclosure would assist in the enforcement of 
other campaign laws because all bundlers would be subject to public and FEC scrutiny.  
Because such disclosures would include all bundlers and apply to all federal elections, 
the disclosures would be substantially related to important governmental interests of 
deterring corruption, providing information to voters, and aiding in enforcement of other 
campaign finance laws, thus satisfying “intermediate scrutiny.”203   
Creating full transparency in the bundling process would not solve all problems 
associated with bundling.  “No campaign finance reform, however attractive, can ever 
work like a magic bullet.”204  Any disclosure requirement implicitly depends upon: (1) 
candidates and political organizations accurately reporting most of the activities and 
relationships of importance to voters, (2) timely and user-friendly reports, (3) interested, 
knowledgeable people who read, interpret and provide useful information to voters, and 
(4) voters who are able and willing to use the information as a basis for making an 
election decision.205  If any of these steps fails, the chain breaks.  For example, if 
reporting requirements are easily sidestepped (step 1) or not consistently applied (see 
discussion of intermediaries in Section III), disclosure laws become powerless.  
Likewise, if voters care more about other issues than they care about campaign funding 
(step 4), they will not act upon what they learn from disclosure, which undermines the 
idea that disclosure will hold campaigns accountable.   
                                                
203 Id. at 202.  
204 Malbin, The Day After Reform, supra note 2 at 5. 
205 Id. at 36. 
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Likewise, bundling disclosure does little to tackle broader campaign finance 
problems.  “Changing an election system requires something more than just rewriting a 
statute.”206  Effective campaign finance reform requires a multi-pronged approach that 
includes disclosure, contribution limits, spending limits, and public financing.207  For 
example, the fact that candidates turn to bundlers and lobbyists to raise money at all is 
arguably problematic.  Momentum is growing for reform to public financing legislation 
that would make the system for viable for candidates, thus reducing the pressure to 
raise cash from individuals.208  Public finance reform would serve to generally remove 
the influence of money in elections, which would have a powerful affect on bundling.  
While this article cannot fully discuss public financing, it references public financing to 
illustrate that no single approach to bundling reform is a “silver bullet.”   
However, while no “silver bullet,” bundling disclosure gives voters the capacity to 
“connect the dots” between the flow of money and political favors and allows the FEC to 
identify problematic bundling activities.  Further, it is exceedingly simple to implement 
and is a relatively unrestrictive means of bringing greater transparency to the bundling 
                                                
206 Michael J. Malbin, The Day After Reform, supra note 2 at 5. 
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208 Fair Elections Now Act, S. 1285, 100th Cong. (2007).  The Fair Elections Now Act, 
for example, is based on clean election laws already in place in Arizona and Maine, 
which are fueled by hundreds of $5 contributions, rather than $2,100 checks written by 
lobbyists, big business and rich donors.  See Mark Lange & Ellen Rose, For Fairer 
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process.  Bundling disclosure, then, is something that can be accomplished “right here, 
right now” to improve bundling and the perhaps improve the public perception of the 
influence of money in campaigns.  Thus, complete disclosure of all bundling activities 
should be adopted.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Bundling is a powerful and useful tool for candidates.  However, it also poses 
serious problems related to the appearance of corruption and circumvention of existing 
campaign finance laws.  Under the Open Government and Honest Leadership Act, 
Congress cast light upon lobbyist bundlers.  However, it left non-lobbyist bundlers, like 
Norman Hsu, in the safety of the shadows.  Unfortunately, there are likely many, many 
more Norman Hsus out there.209  HLOGA’s bundling provision represents a positive, yet 
flawed first step towards tackling problems associated with bundling.  Under the Buckley 
framework, the Act is likely constitutional, but must be expanded to be more effective.  
To seriously address problems associated with bundling, the bundling provision must 
apply to all persons (instead of the Act’s lobbyist-only “persons”) and to all federal 
elections (instead of the Act’s application only to congressional campaigns).  Complete 
bundling disclosure is closely related to the government’s interests of deterring 
corruption and the appearance of corruption, providing information to voters, and aiding 
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in enforcement of other campaign finance laws.  Only through complete disclosure will 
bundling approach a meaningful transparency.210         
                                                
210 Id. 
